Extending the work of Connolly and Rendleman (2008), we document the dominance of Tiger Woods during the 1998-2001 PGA Tour seasons. We show that by playing 'average,' Woods could have won some tournaments and placed no worse than fourth in the tournaments in which he participated in the year 2000, his best on the PGA Tour. No other PGA Tour player in our sample could have come close to such a feat. We also are able to quantify the intimidation factor associated with playing with Woods. On average, players who were paired with Woods during the 1998-2001 period scored 0.462 strokes per round worse than normal. Although we find that Woods' presence in a tournament may have had a small, but statistically significant adverse impact on the entire field, this effect was swamped by the apparent intimidation factor associated with having to play with Tiger side-by-side.
Introduction
By the spring of 2000, after having played on the PGA Tour for less than four years, Tiger Wo o ds had become well established as golf's most feared and intimidating competitor. Typifying this perception, the following appeared on the Golf To day website immediately before the 2000 Masters:
"Tiger Wo o ds, in the midst of crafting one of golf's most dominating stretches of brilliance and the runaway favorite at the Masters, is becoming the Intimidator of world golf. Seeing Wo o ds atop a Sunday leaderboard has signified a fight for second place among the rest of the world's best. The last 13 times he held the lead or was tied for the lead going into the final round he has closed the deal. Wo o ds bearing down on a front-runner has led to gruesome breakdowns and embarrassing collapses sometimes uncomfortable to watch on video replay. The winner of seven of his last 11 tournaments and second or tied for second in three of the others does not deny the effect his hypnotic form has had on some rivals." (Golf To day, 2000) .
Consistent with this perception, Gladwell (2008) states:
"We've seen it a thousand times; top-notch professional golfers crumble on Sunday when in the final pairing with Tiger Wo o ds. Why does this happen with such regularity? What is it that Tiger Wo o ds does to intimidate his fellow golfers and almost guarantee victory for himself?" Is there, indeed, an adverse effect associated with being paired with Tiger Wo o ds in the final round of a tournament, or do players, in general, just 'crumble' in the final round of play? As those who follow professional golf might expect, we find statistically significant adverse effects associated with being paired with Wo o ds in the final round of a PGA Tour event that goes beyond any possible effect associated with simply playing in the final round. Contrary to popular belief, however, those who are paired with Wo o ds perform better when both are in contention to win a tournament than when they are not.
In stark contrast, prior to his winning the 2004 Masters, and as of this writing, winning two more of golf's "major" championships, Phil Mickelson had been labeled as "the best player in the world to have never won a major."
2 Although he had become one of golf's premiere players, he was often accused of choking in majors, especially in the final rounds. Describing Mickelson's propensity to choke, Smith (2001) wrote the following immediately prior to the 2001 PGA Championship:
Mickelson will be among the favourites again, especially on an Atlanta Athletic Club course with the kind of length -7,213 yards for a par 70 -that suits big hitters, and rain-softened greens that will allow him to attack the pins. Then again, his aggressive style is what has cost him so many chances. Mickelson challenges just about every flag, as if the thought never crosses his mind that he might hit a bad shot. The result is missing the green on the short side, leading to bogey or worse. Alas, what Mickelson lacks in majors, he makes up for in macho.
Mickelson is not the only professional golfer to have been labeled as a 'choker,' and he is not likely to be the last. Greg Norman, whose name appeared atop the World Golf Rankings for most of the 1986-1998 period, won two of golf's "majors," but many think he should have won many more. According to the Wikipedia entry on Norman, In 1986, he led all four majors after the third round but won only The [British] Open. This has been referred to as the "Norman Slam" or the "Saturday Slam," as he was leading after the third round on Saturday but lost in the final round on Sunday. He is one of only two players to have competed in -and, like Craig Wo o d, to have lost -play-offs in all four of the major championships. Perhaps the worst meltdown occurred at The Masters in 1996, where he blew a six-stroke lead in the final round and lost the tournament to Nick Faldo by five strokes, shooting a Sunday 78 to Faldo's 67. ESPN, as part of their "ESPN25" 25th-anniversary celebration, ranked Norman's 1996 Masters mishap as the third-biggest sports choke of the last 25 years. Despite the losses, though, Norman still has 30 top-ten finishes in the majors.
More recently, Sergio Garcia, as much as any other top golfer, appears to have inherited Mickelson's choker label. In a May 10, 2005 article on WorldGolf.com, Baldwin (2005) states:
Remember when Sergio Garcia was being touted as Tiger Wo o ds' No. 1 rival? That image is growing fuzzier and fuzzier in the wake of Garcia going Greg Norman on us at the Wachovia Championship over the weekend. Garcia put on a clinic of the fragile mental game that's made the Spaniard with the sensational tools a stunning PGA Tour disappointment. He blew a six-shot lead going into the final round of the Wachovia. Six shots. The last time that's been done Greg Norman was crumbling at the 1996 Masters. But at least, that's the Masters. It is one thing to choke with the green jacket on the line and Jim Nantz breaking into his soothing, soft, Butler Cabin-worshipping tones. It is quite another to do it at Quail Hollow in Charlotte on the second weekend in May. Even Phil Mickelson, the modern-day heir to Norman, saves his gag reflex for the most pressurized tournaments. Or when he's playing Tiger head to head. Not Sergio. He can flop anytime, anywhere. He makes Norman and Mickelson look like Ben Hogan and Jack Nicklaus.
The data we employ in this study cover the period 1998-2001, a period in which Mickelson was clearly the dominant choker, at least in the minds of many who follow professional golf. While it would be interesting to study the purported choking tendencies of Norman, Garcia and, perhaps, others, we simply do not have sufficient data to address the choking tendencies of any player beyond Mickelson.
In this study, we extend our prior work in Connolly and Rendleman (2008, henceforth CR) to address the issue of Tiger Wo o ds' dominance on the PGA Tour, his effect on the play of other tournament participants, including those with whom he is paired, and Phil Mickelson's alleged propensity to play poorly in golf's major championships. In CR, we use a generalized additive model to estimate time-dependent mean skill functions and the first-order autocorrelation of residual scores about their means for 253 active PGA Tour golfers over the 1998-2001 period. In estimating these functions, we remove the estimated (random) effects associated with the relative difficulty of the course on which each round is played and the relative advantage or disadvantage of each player in playing these courses. Although the CR data is somewhat dated, it covers a period of time when Wo o ds had become known as an intimidating force in golf and Mickelson was being accused of choking in majors.
As expected, we find that Wo o ds' play dominated that of other top PGA Tour professionals during our sample period. During year 2000, generally acknowledged as Wo o ds' best on the Tour, Tiger could have won a few tour-naments with no luck at all and many more with just a little bit of luck. By contrast, even his strongest competitors, including David Duval and Phil Mickelson, could not have come close to winning tournaments without a substantial amount of luck.
Interestingly, we find that Mickelson actually played well in golf's majors during the 1998-2001 period and that his level of play, relative to his norm, was comparable to that of Tiger Wo o ds, who won five of 16 majors during this period, including the "Tiger Slam," where he won four majors in a rowthe U.S. Open, British Open and PGA Championship in 2000 followed by the Masters in 2001. Although Mickelson never won a major from 1998 through 2001, we show that he played with a sufficient degree of luck, or his temporary abnormal performance was sufficiently favorable, to have won as many as two major golf championships during this period. In other words, bad luck, or more accurately, the good luck of others, played a substantial role in Mickelson's failure to win any of golf's majors between 1998 and 2001.
Data
We collected individual 18-hole scores for every player in every stroke play tournament on the PGA Tour for years 1998-2001 for a total of 76,456 scores distributed among 1,405 players. After limiting our sample to players who recorded more than 90 scores, the resulting sample employed here and in CR consists of 64,364 observations of 18-hole golf scores for 253 active PGA Tour players over 181 stroke-play events. As we describe in CR, most of these omitted players are not representative of typical PGA Tour players. For example, 565 of the omitted players recorded only two 18-hole scores. (More detailed characteristics of the sample are provided in our other paper.) By excluding these players, we maximize the power of Wang's (1998) cubic spline fitting methodology and minimize potential distortions in estimating the statistical properties of golf scores of regular players on the Tour.
Statistical Model and Preliminary Results

Statistical Model
Our model for estimating the skill and luck components of PGA Tour players' golf scores is described in detail in CR, but we present the major features of the model here in somewhat compressed form. We organize our model of golfer skill and luck using the following general structure:
(1)
In equation (1), s = (s 1 , ..., s 253 ) is a vector of 18-hole scores, subdivided into player groups with n i scores per group. Within each group, the scores are ordered sequentially, with s i = (s i 1 , ..., s i n i ) denoting the vector of scores for player i ordered in the chronological sequence g i = 1, 2, ..., n i . We refer to g i as the sequence of player i's "golf times." The usual error term is part of f (•).
Pf (•) captures time variation in skill for each of the 253 golfers in the sample. P is a matrix that identifies a specific player associated with each score. f (•) = (f 1 (•) , ..., f 253 (•)) is a vector of 253 player-specific cubic spline functions estimated via Wang's (1998) model (described in more detail in the next section).
Our model assumes that there are two important sources of golf-related random effects, one due to round-course interactions and another related to player-course interactions. The N × 848 matrix R identifies round-course interactions associated with each score. A round-course interaction is defined as the interaction between a regular 18-hole round of play in a specific tournament and the course on which the round is played. For 157 of 182 tournaments in our sample, only one course is used and, therefore, there is only one such interaction per round. The remaining 25 tournaments are played on more than one course, generally two courses but as many as four. For example, the first three rounds of the ATT Pebble Beach National Pro Am are played on three different courses using a rotation that assigns each tournament participant to each of the three courses over the first three days of competition. A cut is made after the third round, and a final round is played the fourth day on a single course. Thus, there are 10 round-course interactions associated with the Pebble Beach tournament -three for each of the first three days of competition and one additional interaction for the fourth and final day. There are a total of 848 round-course interactions in our sample and, on average, 254 such interactions per player. The vector of estimated random effects associated with each of the 848 round-course interactions is denoted by b 2 .
In our model, we identify player-course interactions associated with each score using an N × 12, 485 matrix, C, containing 253 groups of nested playercourse interactions. The vector of nested random player-course effects grouped by player is denoted b 3 = (b 3 1 , ..., b 3 253 ) , with b 3 j = b 3 j 1 , ..., b 3 j m j , and m j is the total number of nested player-course interactions associated with player j.
We estimate round-course and player-course effects as random effects, rather than fixed effects, because each class of effects can be thought of as the result of a random draw from a larger population of possible effects. For example, round 1 of the 2001 Masters tournament might have played three strokes more difficult than round 2 for the 'average' participant. This three-stroke difference could have been due to different course setups, weather conditions, etc. In principle, there could have been an infinite number of possible stroke differentials characterizing play in these two rounds, but the differentials actually observed in 2001 could be thought of as random draws from all possible stroke differentials. We also note that scores on some courses, such as TPC Summerlin, where the Invensys Classic at Las Vegas was played, tend to be much lower than those on other courses such as Augusta National, home of the Masters. But in estimating player skill, we believe it is appropriate to think of these courses and their associated difficulty as random draws from all possible tournament venues. Clearly, one could not construct a new sample where these effects were fixed at the same levels as in our original data in the same way that one could 'fix' the effects of a drug dosage administered to two different patient groups in two or more statistical samples. Similarly, we would not expect the attributes of a player's game that would cause him to play better or worse than normal on a given course to remain the same in a new sample. 3 Moreover, our intent is not to test for statistical differences in round-course and player-course effects but, rather, to control for variation in player scoring arising from these effects. Hence, in estimating player skill, we model round-course and player course effects as random rather than fixed. Wang's smoothing spline model, as applied to individual player i, may be written
In (2), h i (g i ) is Wang's smoothing spline function applied to player i's golf scores over his specific golf times g i = 1, 2, ..., n i . (As noted above, g i counts player i's golf scores in chronological order.) The vector of potentially autocorrelated random errors associated with player i's spline fit is denoted θ i with θ i = (θ i 1 ,θ i 2 , ...., θ i n i ) ∼ N 0, σ 3 It is also possible that courses could be lengthened or otherwise redesigned, causing these relationships to change. 4 We describe a sequence of experiments in CR that we used to fine-tune the specification of golf-related random effects.
5 In Wang's model, W −1 i is a covariance matrix whose form depends on specific assump-For any given player, i, f = (f 1 , ....f n ) denotes the vector of the player's n sequentially ordered golf scores, adjusted for estimated round-course and player-course effects. Also, h = (h (t 1 ) , ....h (t n )) denotes a vector of values from the player's estimated cubic spline function evaluated at points t 1 , ...., t n , which represent golf times g = 1, 2, ..., n scaled to the [0, 1] interval. In Wang's model, as applied here, for each player, one chooses the cubic spline function h (t), the smoothing parameter, λ, and the first-order autocorrelation coefficient, φ, embedded in W that minimizes
In equation (3) below, we break θ i into two parts, ϕ i +η i , where ϕ i represents the autocorrelated component of θ i and η i is assumed to be white noise.
Inasmuch as there are likely to be gaps in calendar time between some adjacent points in a player's golf time, it is unlikely that random errors around individual player spline fits follow higher-order autoregressive processes (i.e., AR(n), n > 1). Therefore, we assume that each θ i follows a player-specific AR(1) processes with first-order autocorrelation coefficient φ i .
7
Based on Wang (1998), we then estimate a cubic spline-based time-varying mean skill level for each player, after adjusting each player's 18-hole score by estimated random round-course effects common to all players and estimated random player-course effects. These estimated effects capture the tendency of individual players to perform better or worse than normal on specific courses. It should be noted that we do not include specific information about playing conditions (e.g., adverse weather as in Brown (2008) , pin placements, morning or afternoon starting times, etc.) when estimating random round-course eftions about dependencies in the errors, for example first-order autocorrelation for time series, compound symmetry for repeated measures, etc. See Wang (1998, p. 343) for further detail.
6 "The parameterλcontrols the trade-off between goodness-of-fit and the smoothness of the [spline] estimate" (Wang (1998, p. 342) ).
7 Although the potential for autocorrelated θ i residuals comes into play in estimating each player's cubic spline function, we do not focus on the correlation in residual errors in this paper. However, in CR, we show that the first-order autocorrelation coefficient in θ i errors is positive for 155 of the 253 players in our sample. Only two players show evidence of significant negative autocorrelation in θ i residuals, and 20 to 23 players (depending on the test) show evidence of significant positive autocorrelation. Using the methodology of Ljung and Box (1978) , we determine that there is no significant higher-order autocorrelation in η i residuals -once we adjust for first-order autocorrelation in θ i residuals, the remaining residual error for all 253 players represents white noise. fects, b 2 . Nevertheless, if such conditions combine to produce abnormal scores in a given 18-hole round, the effects of these conditions should be reflected in the estimated round-course-related random effects. The methodology for estimating our model is described in the Appendix of CR.
Before turning to the estimation results, it is worthwhile to consider ask how we define luck in the context of the model we are using. A universallyacceptable definition of luck is beyond the scope of this paper. As we noted in CR, our view is that professional golfers think of luck as sources of variation in scoring outside a player's direct and conscious control. For example, good luck might take the form of a player assigned to a relatively easy course rotation in a multiple-course tournament. We can estimate the extent of such "luck" through the round-course effect. Similarly, players might attribute to good luck any favorable outcome associated with playing on a course that favors a particular player's style because a player cannot choose the course on which a tournament is played. We estimate the magnitude of this "luck" through player-course effects.
Any remaining variation in a player's score, not attributable to roundcourse and player-course effects, is reflected in the θ i error. Clearly, some of the θ i error reflects variation due to easily recognizable factors external to the golfer himself and that we do not measure: lucky bounces, good and bad lies, relatively favorable or unfavorable weather conditions, and so on. Some variation, due, say to physical variation in a player's swing, may not be nearly as easy for observers to identify. For example, given the intrinsic skill level of a particular player, assume that there is a 50% chance that he will sink a 14-foot putt. If he sinks five such putts in a row, and his intrinsic skill level has not changed, this might indicate this player experienced good luck (favorable variation). The source of this performance may be a temporary improvement in his ability to read the green, but if the player cannot sustain this improvement, we would call it luck when he sinks five long putts in a row. On the other hand, if he can sustain this improvement, this implies a change in skill and we capture that in the smoothing spline.
Preliminary Results
Estimated random round-course effects range from −3.92 to 6.95 strokes per round.
8 By contrast, estimated random player-course effects contribute very little to the variation in scoring, ranging from −0.065 to 0.044 strokes per round, an insufficient amount to have any impact on the overall scores in a typical four-round PGA Tour event.
Much of the focus in this paper is on the estimated spline fits for individual players and associated θ i and η i errors (hereafter, we suppress the i subscripts). When we refer to a player playing "normal," we are referring to a situation in which his 18-hole score for a given round, adjusted for estimated round-course and player-course effects, equals the time-dependent mean score for that same round given by the player's estimated cubic spline function. Thus, a player who plays "normal" plays exactly as predicted by his estimated time-dependent mean skill level rather than at a level that might be characteristic of PGA Tour players in general. θerrors can be viewed as differences between actual 18-hole scores and predicted scores, taking into account timedependent cubic spline-based estimates of mean skill levels after adjusting for random round-course and player-course effects but without adjusting for autocorrelation in random error structures. ηerrors represent θerrors adjusted for first-order autocorrelation.
Spline fits for Tiger Wo o ds, David Duval and Phil Mickelson, three golfers whose performance is analyzed in this study, are shown in Figure 1 . Actual 18-hole scores, reduced by random round-course and player-course effects, are plotted about the smooth spline fits. The spline fit for Tiger Wo o ds is Ushaped, reaching its minimum in year 2000, regarded as the best year in Wo o ds' professional career. Spline fits for David Duval and Phil Mickelson turn out to be linear, with Duval's being positively sloped, indicating his skill was deteriorating, and Mickelson's being negatively sloped, indicating an improvement in skill. (Over all 253 players, 105 spline fits are exactly linear.) "Scaled golf time" for each player represents the chronological sequence of rounds for the player scaled to the {0, 1} interval. Although all three players participated on the PGA Tour during roughly the same period of time, the scaled golf times for each player represent the sequencing of their own scores rather than the joint sequencing of the scores of the three players. Throughout CR and the present study, we use the spline fits as a means of characterizing player skill and the variation in player skill over our sample period but do not extrapolate the spline fits outside the range of our data. Figure 1 shows each individual player's spline fit relative to his 18-hole scores adjusted for estimated random round-course and player-course effects. Although the pseudo adjusted R-square for the model as a whole is 0.296, calculated as 1-Mean square error/M ean square total, the pseudo adjusted R-squares for the individual spline fits are not nearly as high. For example, for Wo o ds, Duval and Mickelson, the pseudo adjusted R-squares associated with their respective spline fits are 0.070, −0.003 and 0.034, with the highest being 0.408 for Billy Ray Brown.
Based on the relatively low individual pseudo adjusted R-squares, one might argue for a model simpler than a cubic spline function for estimating player skill. In CR, we use the bootstrap to show that the spline model is significantly superior (at the 5% level) to a player's mean score, adjusted for round-course and player-course effects, for 71 of 253 players. It is significantly superior to a linear time trend for 25 of the players and to a quadratic time trend for 10 players. In addition, the spline model is superior to a timedependent mean-adjusted score that varies by calendar year for 13 players. Even though a simpler functional form might adequately capture time variation in mean player skill for the great majority of players, the spline model should (approximately) capture that simpler functional form when appropriate, but also capture more complex forms of time-varying skill when such patterns arise in the data. Figure 1 shows the greatest dispersion of 18-hole scores (after adjusting for variation in scoring due to random round-course and player-course effects) for Phil Mickelson, followed by David Duval and Tiger Wo o ds. In fact, the standard deviations of θresidual scores for these three players are 3.02, 2.82 and 2.46 strokes, respectively, with the range for all 253 players in our sample of 2.14 to 3.44 strokes per round. Mickelson's standard deviation of 3.02 strokes ranks 15th highest, while Wo o ds' standard deviation of 2.46 strokes ranks 22nd lowest. Although Figure 1 shows that Duval and Mickelson were capable of shooting scores as low as Wo o ds, they did not do so as consistently. Moreover, Wo o ds' worst scores were not generally as high as those of Duval and Mickelson.
The Dominance of Tiger Wo o ds
In our original study, we demonstrate that the average total θresidual winning score per tournament over the 181 tournaments in our sample was −9.64 strokes, with the total θresidual ranging from +0.13 strokes for Tiger Wo o ds in the 1999 Walt Disney World Resort Classic to −21.59 strokes for Mark Calcavecchia in the 2001 Phoenix Open.
9 The 1999 Walt Disney Resort Classic is the only tournament in our sample won by a player with a positive total θresidual score, meaning that the winner played slightly worse than normal as estimated by our model. We also demonstrate that most players among the 20 to 30 best finishers in a tournament experienced negative total θresid-ual scores. If the θresidual is viewed as a "luck factor," our results indicate that to win a tournament on the PGA Tour, one must experience a sufficient amount of good luck to not only shoot a low total score, but to also overcome the collective good luck of the other participants in the tournament. Only Tiger Wo o ds was sufficiently skilled to have won a PGA Tour event during our sample period by playing "normal."
10 An interesting way of assessing Wo o ds' dominance is to ask how well he would have placed in the tournaments in which he participated by simply playing "normal," and, therefore, experiencing no good luck as estimated by our model.
11 During the 1999-2001 period, Wo o ds participated in 85 regular stroke-play events on the PGA Tour and never missed a cut in any of these tournaments. By contrast, David Duval, generally regarded as the secondbest player during this period, missed six cuts, and Phil Mickelson missed 15. (Mickelson's missing nine more cuts than Duval most likely reflects the greater variability in Mickelson's scores (adjusted for random round-course and playercourse effects) rather than his slightly higher spline-predicted score.) Table 1 lists these 85 tournaments along with the winning score, Wo o ds' score, his expected score and his total θresidual score.
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For example, in the 1998 Mercedes Championships, the first tournament listed in Table 1 , the winning score was 271 (column 1) and Wo o ds' score was 272 (column 2). Although not shown in the table, Wo o d's predicted score using the sum of the first four predicted scores from his h i (g i ) cubic spline fit was 277.36 strokes. Cumulative four-round random round-course and −2.418 strokes, or −9.67 strokes total for a 'standard' four-round tournament.
10 Studying the history of money winnings of PGA Tour players, rather than 18-hole scores, as we do, Puterman and Wittman (2009) assess golfer performance over a playing career. They demonstrate convincingly that Tiger Wo o ds is an extraordinary player compared to the rest of the PGA Tour professionals.
11 This analysis does not take into account the possible effect that Wo o d's normal play might have on the play of others, such as that documented in Section 5.
12 Wo o ds actually participated in one more regular stroke-play event, the 1998 ATT Pebble Beach National Pro Am. The first two rounds of this tournament were played in January, 1998, but the weather was so bad that the third and fourth rounds could not be completed. A third and final round was postponed and re-scheduled for July 1998. Many players, including Wo o ds, chose not to play in this final round. Because of the unusual nature of this event, and the fact that Wo o ds chose not to complete the tournament, we have not included it in our analysis in Table 1. player-course effects (also not shown in the table) were −1.465 and −0.027 strokes, respectively. Therefore, adding these random effects to his splinepredicted score, we would have expected Wo o ds to shoot 277.36 − 1.465 − 0.027 = 275.87 in the 1998 Mercedes Championships, the value shown as Wo o d's expected score in column 3.
13 Since his actual score was 272, his total four-round θresidual score was 272 − 275.87 = −3.87, the value shown in column 4, indicating that Wo o ds played 3.87 strokes better than predicted. Thus, if Wo o ds had played to his norm over the four rounds of the Mercedes Championships, he would have shot 275.87. (We ignore the fact that golf is scored in integers and cannot involve fractional amounts.) Columns 5 and 6 indicate that Wo o ds finished in a two-way tie for second in the tournament. Column 7, the key column in this analysis, indicates that if Wo o ds' total score had been 275.87 as predicted, he would have placed sixth overall.
The average of values in column 7 indicate that if Wo o ds had played as predicted in 1998, his average finish in the 19 stroke-play PGA Tour events in which he participated would have been 10.94, or 11th place. In 1998, his best finish playing average would have been fourth. A slightly improved pattern emerges in 1999, where he would have finished in sixth place on average by playing "normal," and he could have won one tournament, which he did, by playing "normal" and finished among the top three in six more.
There is one striking outlier among the 1999 PGA Tour events in which Wo o ds participated -the ATT Pebble Beach National Pro Am -in which he would have placed 37th by playing "normal." Otherwise, his worst finish in 1999 would have been seventh place. The reason for this outlier is that the course rotation to which Wo o ds was assigned played 5.44 strokes more difficult than the easiest rotation. As shown in Table 2 , only one player among the top 14 finishers in the tournament played a difficult course rotation (as indicated by a non-negative total round-course effect). They were all blessed with a rotation that played approximately 5 strokes less difficult than Wo o ds'. By contrast, 10 players among the bottom 16 played one of the difficult rotation assignments as indicated by a total round-course effect greater than three strokes. Note that no one among the top 14 finished the tournament with a positive total residual score, and no one among the bottom 16 finished with a negative total residual. This is consistent with CR, where we show that almost all players who end up among the leaders in a PGA Tour event finish with negative total residual scores.
Year 2000, generally regarded as Wo o ds' best on the PGA Tour, is the year in which Wo o ds won the final three majors of the year en route to his eventual "Tiger Slam." Table 1 
Psychological Pressure of Competing Against Tiger Wo o ds
Over the years, we have heard many radio and television commentators claim that those who are paired with Tiger Wo o ds tend to perform poorly, presumably due to the psychological pressure that Wo o ds places on his fellow competitors. Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that those who are paired with Wo o ds in the final group on the final day of a PGA Tour event tend to perform poorly relative to expectations (i.e., some would say that these players choke).
14 In a recent paper, Brown (2008) posits that when competitors in tournaments or other settings such as the general workforce must compete against "superstars," their productivity may be diminished because they feel there is no chance that they can compete successfully against the superstars. She tests her hypothesis by examining the differential performance of PGA Tour players in tournaments in which Wo o ds, the superstar, competes and does not compete over the period 1999 to 2006. She concludes that there is a significant diminution of performance among regular PGA Tour players when Wo o ds is also participating in the tournament. Tables 3 and 4 summarize all of our tests involving Wo o ds' impact on the play of others in the field, including tests that address Brown's hypothesis directly. In all tests, we regress ηresiduals against one or more dummy variables involving the interaction of tournament participants with Wo o ds. We regress ηresiduals rather than θresiduals against dummies to more accurately isolate the pure impact of players' interactions with Tiger. Otherwise, a portion of a player's abnormal performance in a given round would be attributable to the carryover of abnormal performance in previous rounds and could contaminate the effects we are trying to estimate.
In our first test, summarized in Table 3 , we regress ηresiduals against a dummy variable indicating whether Wo o ds is participating in the tournament for which the ηresidual is estimated.
15 This is a direct test of Brown's hypothesis, but we use a different dataset and an entirely different statistical methodology for estimating abnormal performance. The coefficient on the dummy variable that indicates whether Wo o ds is in the field is 0.051 strokes per round and has a p-value of 0.0211. Thus, ignoring other factors involving Wo o ds' interaction with other participants during tournament play, we find a statistically significant effect associated with having Wo o ds in the field. In general, scores of players other than Wo o ds are 0.051 strokes higher (worse) in 14 In PGA Tour events, the top two players at the end of the next-to-last day of play, generally the third round, are paired together in the last group in the fourth and final round.
15 As reported in CR, the original model took 40 hours to estimate on a Windows XPbased PC with 1 GB RAM using a 2.80-GHz Intel Xenon processor. Therefore, we do not reestimate the CR model using the additional dummy variables in test 1 nor in any subsequent tests. Moreover, we do not test for the significance of the dummy variable coefficients in the context of a re-estimated model, which would require the use of the bootstrap, the method of significance testing used in CR. In CR, it took over five days to produce 40 bootstrap samples and, therefore, it would be impractical to employ a re-estimated model with accompanying bootstrap tests for the various estimation specifications employed in this study.
tournaments in which Wo o ds participates. Although statistically significant, this finding has little practical significance, since over the four rounds of play in a typical PGA Tour event, the total effect of having Wo o ds in the field would be 0.051 × 4 = 0.24 strokes, an insufficient amount to change the final total score of any player whose score is 0.051 strokes per round higher due to Wo o ds' presence in the tournament. By contrast, Brown finds that when Wo o ds is in the field, the performance of regular PGA Tour players deteriorates by 0.2 strokes per round.
In our second test, we separate players into two groups for tournaments in which Wo o ds is in the field. The first group includes those who are paired with Wo o ds, and the second group includes those with whom Wo o ds is not playing. In these regressions of ηresiduals, the coefficient associated with playing with Wo o ds is 0.478, and with a p-value of 0.0004, is statistically significant. The coefficient associated with not being paired with Wo o ds when he is in the field is 0.043, with a p-value of 0.0505. Thus, it appears that Wo o ds' adverse impact on the play of others is real and statistically significant for those with whom he is paired but very small for those with whom is is not paired.
In test 3, we regress ηresiduals against a dummy variable indicating whether the player associated with the ηresidual score is actually playing with Wo o ds in the same group. This is a slightly different test than test 2, since all other players are treated the same, even if Tiger is not playing in the tournament. The estimated coefficient is 0.462 with a p-value of 0.0005. Consistent with test 2, being paired with Wo o ds, rather than just having Tiger in the field, appears to have an adverse impact on player scores.
In test 4, we examine the effects of playing with Wo o ds on a round-byround basis. As is evident from the total winning scores shown in Table 1 , all but two of the tournaments in which Wo o ds participated in the 1998-2001 period involved four rounds of play, with the exceptions being the 1998 Buick Invitational and the 1999 ATT Pebble Beach National Pro Am, which were cut short due to adverse weather conditions. Test 4 shows positive coefficients for each round in which players are paired with Wo o ds, but the coefficients are statistically significant only for the first and fourth rounds, where the estimated coefficients are 0.611 and 0.857, respectively. It should be noted that in almost all PGA Tour events, players who are paired together in the first round are also paired together in the second. If we were forced to tell a story based on the results of test 4, the coefficient estimates suggest that players paired with Wo o ds in the first round of a tournament may be nervous and intimidated, but by the second day they settle down and play more to their norm. The coefficient of 0.857 for round 4 suggests that players succumb to more pressure playing with Wo o ds on the final day of a tournament when the "money is on the line."
In test 5 we address the question of whether the apparent adverse effect of playing with Wo o ds in round 4 is simply the effect of playing in the final round rather than the effect of playing with Wo o ds. In this test we separate scores from the final scheduled round of a tournament into two groups. 16 The first group includes scores of players who are playing in the final scheduled round with Wo o ds, and the second group includes those playing in the final scheduled round but not with Wo o ds. The coefficient associated with playing in the final round without Wo o ds is not significantly different from zero, while that associated with playing with Wo o ds in the final scheduled round is 0.858 with a p-value of 0.0030. Thus, there does appear to be an adverse effect associated with playing with Wo o ds in the final round separate from any overall final round effect.
To further test the hypothesis that players may succumb to more pressure playing with Wo o ds on the final day of a tournament when the "money is on the line," we separate players paired with Wo o ds in round 4 into two groups. The first are players who are paired with Wo o ds when he is "in contention," with "in contention" defined in various ways, below. The second are players paired with Wo o ds when he is not in contention.
Our first definition of "in contention" is Wo o ds playing in the final group in a final scheduled tournament round. In all PGA Tour stroke-play events, after the cut, the order of play in subsequent rounds is determined by a player's position at the end of the previous round. After the cut, those who lead a tournament at the end of round t are paired in the final group and tee off last on day t + 1. Thus, if a player is playing in the last group with Wo o ds on the final day of a tournament, the two must be among the top two players in the field entering the final round and, obviously, with the exception of others who may be tied with Wo o ds and his playing partner(s), are in the best position to win the tournament.
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One might think that if there was ever a time of intimidation associated with playing with Wo o ds, it would be when one is paired with Wo o ds on the final day in a strong position to win a tournament. However, the data don't bear this out. The initial specification of test 6 shows that those who play with Wo o ds on the final day of a tournament when Wo o ds is not in the final group shoot 1.122 strokes worse than normal (p-value = 0.0019). By contrast, those who are paired with Wo o ds in the final round when he is playing in the final group shoot only 0.389 strokes worse than normal, which, with a p-value of 0.4184, is not statistically different from zero. We note that there are only 31 instances of players being paired with Wo o ds in the final group during the 1998-2001 period, and, therefore, we may not have a powerful test.
We also define Wo o ds being in contention as Tiger being within ten, eight, six, four, two or zero strokes of the lead going into the final round. As shown in the second through fifth specifications of test 6, if being in contention is defined as Wo o ds being within four to ten strokes of the lead, those who are paired with Tiger in the final round when he is in contention score 0.80 to 0.88 strokes worse than normal, with p-values ranging from 0.0087 to 0.0297. Note that this effect is essentially the same as the 0.857 adverse strokes per round associated with simply playing with Tiger in the final round (test 4). In essence, since Wo o ds is almost always within four to ten strokes of the lead going into the final round of a tournament, defining Wo o ds "being in contention" in this fashion is hardly more than identifying that Tiger is playing in the final round.
The final two specifications of test 6 show that when "being in contention" is defined as Wo o ds being within two strokes of the lead or tied for the lead or better, the adverse affect associated with playing with Tiger in the final round falls to 0.690 and 0.329 strokes, respectively, but neither estimate is statistically significant. When these results are paired alongside those where "being in contention" is defined as Wo o ds playing in the final group, contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no statistically significant adverse affect associated with being paired with Tiger in the final round at times when Tiger is truly in a position to win. Perhaps the best explantation for this misperception is that Wo o ds is so much more skilled than those with whom he might be paired in the final round of a tournament that when his playing partners play close to their norm, compared to Wo o ds they appear to be playing poorly.
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18 It is important to note that in a typical PGA Tour event, player pairings for the first two rounds are determined prior to the start of play and do not reflect tournament performance. However, after the cut (typically after round 2), player pairings are based on cumulative performance in the tournament's previous rounds. Generally, those who are paired together have recorded the same score, or very close to the same score, going into the round for which they are paired. Since Tiger Wo o ds is so highly skilled, if a player is paired with Wo o ds in the third or fourth rounds, he probably played with an exceptionally degree of good luck during the tournament's previous rounds. Thus, on average, those who are paired with Wo o ds in the third or fourth rounds of a tournament should have had a negative cumulative tournament residual score prior to being paired with Wo o ds. Since θresidual scores must sum to zero, and ηresiduals sum close to zero (on average, over all 64,364 observations, the average ηis 0.00006), an expected negative cumulative tournament η residual, conditional on being paired with Wo o ds in the third or fourth round, implies a It should be noted that when a player is paired with Wo o ds in the final round of a tournament and Wo o ds is within 'X' strokes of the lead, the player paired with Wo o ds is probably also within 'X' strokes of the lead or very close. Therefore, it is possible that any adverse effect on a player's score when paired with Wo o ds in the final round has nothing to do with Wo o ds but, rather, reflects the effect of being within 'X' strokes of the lead. To test this hypothesis, we ran a series of six regressions of ηresiduals in final scheduled tournament rounds against dummy variables reflecting whether a player (not Wo o ds) is or is not in contention and whether he is paired with Wo o ds.
19 The six regressions vary according to the specification of being in contention, with "in contention" defined as being within ten, eight, six, four, two or zero strokes of the lead in tests 7-12, respectively. Coefficient estimates and associated pvalues are summarized in Table 4 .
In all tests, the coefficient associated with being paired with Tiger Wo o ds is statistically significant and of the same order of magnitude as in test 5 (summarized in Table 3 ). In tests 8-10, where being in contention is defined as being within four to eight strokes of the lead, the "in contention" coefficient is also significant and on an order of magnitude of 0.104 to 0.171 strokes per round.
positive expected residual in subsequent rounds. This is not because players who are paired with Wo o ds tend to choke, but because ηresiduals must sum (close) to zero. In a second set of tests whose results we do not report, we adjust residual scores for rounds in which players are paired with Wo o ds by an amount that reflects the player's performance in the previous rounds of the same tournament. For example, consider a player who records a total of 102 scores in our four-year sample period. Assume this player is paired with Wo o ds in round 3 of a particular tournament. During rounds 1 and 2 of the same tournament, the player's η residual scores are −2 and −3, respectively. Since the sum of the player's ηresidual scores must be close to zero, we would expect the remaining 100 ηresidual scores for the same player to sum to 5, or 0.05 strokes per round. Therefore, in this instance, we would subtract 0.05 strokes from the player's actual third-round ηresidual when computing the effect of being paired with Wo o ds in the third round, and we would make similar adjustments to η residual when running regressions involving pairings with Wo o ds in the fourth round. As it turns out, these adjustments make little if any difference in our test results. Consistent with our assumption that players who are paired with Wo o ds should have recorded negative ηresidual scores on average in a tournament's previous rounds, all coefficients associated with being paired with Wo o ds are lower than those reported in Table 3 . However, at most, the coefficients are reduced by 0.03 strokes, and all that are statistically significant prior to the adjustment remain so after the adjustment.
19 Some tournaments are cut short due to adverse weather conditions. In most cases, a decision is made to end the tournament after the next-to-last scheduled round is played. Since our intent is to estimate the effect of being in contention, if a tournament is cut short, a player who turned out to be in contention going into the final round most likely did not know it at the time. Therefore, in these tests, we only consider final round scoring in tournaments played the full number of originally scheduled rounds.
In tests 5 and 6, where "in contention" is defined as being within two stokes of the lead or actually being in the lead going into the final scheduled round, the estimated "in contention" coefficients are slightly higher but insignificant, most likley due to insufficient observations. Overall, the results suggest that those who are in contention going into the final scheduled round of a tournament with some possibility of winning play a little worse than normal. This might be due to nervousness or a tendency to take more risks, which could lead to higher scores.
Overall, our results contrast with those of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2008) who study the effect of pairings in PGA Tour events during the 2002, 2005 and 2006 seasons. Examining all parings, not just those involving Tiger Wo o ds, these authors find no evidence that the ability of playing partners affects the performance of professional golfers. For pairings involving Wo o ds, they find that players perform 0.354 strokes per round better than average, but this amount is not statistically significant. Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo use a statistical method for estimating abnormal performance entirely different from ours and estimate the effects of player pairings over a different period of time. Thus, our findings and theirs may not be directly comparable.
How Poorly did Phil Mickelson Perform in "Majors"
Until Phil Mickelson won the 2004 Masters, he was accused, almost unmercifully, of choking in the four major golf championships. 20 Despite his stellar record in other PGA Tour events, his lack of success in majors would have defined him as a good player, but not a great player, if he had never won a major championship in golf. At the same time, it was generally understood that Tiger Wo o ds stepped up his game in major championships, winning a total of five out of a possible 16 over the 1998-2001 period. Table 5 summarizes Phil Mickelson's performance in the 16 major golf championships over our four-year sample period. Mickelson missed the cut in the 1999 British Open but, otherwise, made the cut in the remaining 15 events. The values in the first four columns of Table 5 correspond to those in Table 1 except that Table 1 involves the scoring of Tiger Wo o ds rather than Mickelson.
Column 1 shows the winning score for each of the 16 tournaments, and column 2 shows Mickelson's score. Phil's total four-round θresidual score is shown in column 4. (Here, we focus on θresiduals, rather than ηresiduals, because we are concerned about the extent to which Mickelson played better or worse than normal, regardless of whether his abnormal performance resulted from a carryover of abnormal performance from previous rounds.) Subtracting this total residual from his actual score gives his expected score in column 3. For example, in the 1998 Masters, Mickelson's actual total score was 286, and his θresidual score was −4.60. Thus, Mickelson played a total of 4.60 strokes better than normal over the four rounds of play. If he had played "normal" his four-round total would have been 286 − (−4.60) = 290.60, the value shown as his expected score in column 3.
Note that in two of the 16 tournaments, Mickelson's total residual score was very low, −12.26 strokes in the 1999 U.S. Open and −9.50 strokes in the 2001 PGA Championship. As we demonstrate in CR, the average total θresidual winning score per tournament over the 181 tournaments in our sample was −9.64 strokes. Thus, Mickelson, being more highly skilled than the typical winner of a PGA Tour event, could have won most tournaments in which he played if his total four-round residual score had been −9.50 strokes or better, assuming, of course, that the scores of all other tournament participants would have remained the same..
We now address the question of how many majors Mickelson could have won by performing at the level associated with his −12.26 four-round total residual score in the 1999 U.S. Open. For example, Mickelson's expected score in the 1998 Masters was 290.60. If his residual score in the 1998 Masters had been −12.26 as in the 1999 U.S. Open, Mickelson's four-round total score would have been 290.60 − 12.26 = 278.34. This is lower than the actual winning score of 279, so Mickelson would have won the 1998 Masters by playing at the same level relative to his norm as he did in the 1999 U.S. Open (ignoring that golf is not played with fractional scores and that his higher level of play would have had no impact on the play of others in the tournament). Stated differently, the degree of luck, or temporary abnormal performance, that Mickelson experienced in the 1999 U.S. Open would have been sufficient to have enabled him to win the 1998 Masters. Applying this same logic to all 15 majors for which Mickelson made the cut, we see that Phil's abnormal performance in the 1999 U.S. Open, if applied to the other majors, would have enabled him to win 11 of 16 times. Unfortunately for Phil, Payne Stewart's total θresidual score of −14.301 strokes in the 1999 U.S. Open (not shown in Table 5 ), was a sufficient departure from his norm to have enabled Stewart to place one stroke ahead of Phil. Did Mickelson choke? Certainly not, but, apparently, he did not have quite as much good luck as Payne Stewart.
If we apply Mickelson's total residual score of −9.50 strokes in the 2001 PGA Championship to all 15 tournaments in which he made the cut, we see that he played sufficiently well to have won three. Although not as compelling as his performance in the 1999 U.S. Open, the results summarized in Table 5 suggest that Phil played well enough during the 1998 to 2001 period to have won one or two major golf championships. Table 6 shows the average θresidual score in the 16 majors for both Wo o ds and Mickelson on a round-by-round basis. Note that both tended to play better than their norms in the first two rounds. Wo o ds performed an average of 0.632 and 0.610 strokes better than normal in the first two rounds of majors compared with Mickelson's 0.903 and 1.421-stroke superior-than-normal performance. Thus, in the first two rounds, Mickelson actually played better than Wo o ds, relative to his norm.
The story changes somewhat in the third and fourth rounds. Wo o ds tended to play closer to his norm in the final two rounds, and Mickelson played approximately one-half stroke worse than his norm. Perhaps those who accused Mickelson of choking in the final two rounds of major championships did not realize that he had generally played exceptionally well in the first two rounds but had gotten back to (roughly) normal in the second two. Playing one-half stroke per round worse than normal should not be considered choking.
Overall, Wo o ds played 0.382 strokes better than normal in the 16 majors, and Mickelson's performance averaged 0.317 strokes better than his norm. To ensure that these averages are not dominated by outliers, we calculated the proportion of rounds in majors that both players played better than "normal." Wo o ds recorded a negative θresidual in 35 or 64 total rounds in majors, or 54.7% of his rounds, while Mickelson played better than "normal" in 37 of 62 rounds, or 59.7% overall. Thus, the general consensus that Wo o ds stepped up his game in majors and Mickelson choked is hardly fair, at least from 1998 to 2001.
Compared with Mickelson, Wo o ds' success in majors lay mainly from his superior skill level. Over our entire four-year sample period, the average value of Wo o ds' spline-based estimated skill was 68.18 strokes per round. The same average for the next-best-player, David Duval, was 69.15, almost a full stroke difference. Mickelson's average was 69.51. Therefore, Wo o ds had an average 69.51 − 68.18 = 1.33 per round stroke advantage over Mickelson based on skill alone, or 1.33×4 = 5.32 strokes over a full four-round tournament. This is a lot of ground to have to make up in golf. So it is not surprising that by playing in majors roughly at the same skill levels relative to their norms, Wo o ds won five majors and Mickelson won none. It is unfortunate, however, that Mickelson was characterized as an incomplete player who could not handle the pressure of golf's major championships.
Summary and Conclusions
Using the model in Connolly and Rendleman (2008) , we demonstrate that by playing "normal," Tiger Wo o ds could have won some tournaments and placed no worse than fourth in the tournaments in which he participated in year 2000, his best on the PGA Tour. More generally, his average finishing position would have been 11th, 6th, 2nd, and 7th in years 1998-2001, respectively, if he had played "normal." No other PGA Tour player in our sample came close to such a feat.
We also quantify the intimidation factor associated with playing with Wo o ds. On average, players who were paired with Wo o ds during the 1998-2001 period scored 0.462 strokes per round worse than normal. Although we find that Wo o d's presence in a tournament may have had a small, but statisically significant adverse impact on the entire field, this effect was swamped by the apparent intimidation factor associated with having to play with Wo o ds sideby-side. However, contrary to popular belief, the adverse effect associated with being paired with Wo o ds was the smallest when Wo o ds and his playing partners were in contention to win.
It is also commonly held that Phil Mickelson performed poorly in majors prior to winning the Masters in 2004. However, our data suggest the opposite. Although Mickelson won no majors during our 1998-2001 sample period, he played sufficiently well to have won one or two majors under normal circumstances. Moreover, his overall performance in majors, relative to his estimated skill level, was comparable to that of Tiger Wo o ds, the winner of five major golf championships from 1998 to 2001. Thus, the general characterization of Wo o ds as golf's dominant player over the 1998-2001 period was accurate, but the frequent characterization of Phil Mickelson performing poorly in majors and choking was not.
We believe that the methods used in the analysis here should lend themselves favorably to modeling performance in a number of other sports. The list of sports where athletes compete against one another indirectly is substantial: skiing, track and field, bowling, diving, equestrian, figure skating, gymnastics, rowing, shooting, swimming, weightlifting, and yachting. In each case, the athletes do not have to contend with direct play of competitors as in basketball, volleyball, or tennis, but compete against a course and other athletes indirectly. In some settings, the importance of random effects may be very small. In diving, for example, the board is the same height for everyone. Unlike golf, there is no variation in the athletic environment. In skiing, however, athletes compete on multiple mountains over a season, and weather and course conditions may vary over the term of a competition. This suggests that controls for these effects might be important.
If our sample were sufficiently large, and covered a much longer period than 1998-2001, we could compare the relative skills of players who participated in golf during different eras. Even though Tiger Wo o ds never participated with Ben Hogan, Tiger's skill relative to that of Hogan could be estimated through their joint connections to players such as Arnold Palmer, Jack Nicklaus, and Greg Norman who played between the two eras but also overlapped with Hogan's era in the 1950s and 1960s and Wo o ds era during the late 1990s and 2000s. And, of course, similar comparisons could be made in other sports.
Besides measuring the relative importance of skill and luck in athletic performance, our methods might also be used to construct athlete rankings. Using a proper model, the spline fit at a point in time is an estimate of athletic skill that accounts for multiple factors affecting measured outcomes. We believe it would prove to be an interesting exercise to compare rankings generated by proper statistical models of athletic performance to those commonly used.
There are some additional, potentially interesting applications of rankings constructed in this manner. League tables in investment banking rank firms on the basis of the value of deals completed. Breaking down these totals to reflect skill vs. luck might provide an interesting alternative to the current system which does not distinguish between the firm's skill and random influences. Mutual and hedge fund performance rankings might prove to be another interesting area to apply the methods described here. Plots show 18-hole scores reduced by random round-course and playercourse effects along with corresponding spline fits (smooth lines). Scaled golf time for each player represents the chronological sequence of rounds for the player scaled to the {0, 1} interval. 
